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Preface
The Centre for Applied and Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe 
and the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the 
Western Cape are jointly implementing a three-year regional programme of analysis 
and communication on CBNRM in Southern Africa. The Ford Foundation and the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) fund the programme.
The aim of the programme is to contribute to the sustainable enhancement of rural 
livelihoods in Southern Africa by promoting a broader and deeper understanding of 
how natural resources can be used and managed sustainably through group based 
institutions and decision-making. The specific objectives for the programme are to:
♦ Enhance regional understanding- of opportunities and constraints of CBNRM 
through in-depth analysis, comparison, synthesis, theoretical development and 
operational recommendations;
♦ Draw lessons for CBNRM policy and practice through the analysis of cross- 
regional and cross-sectoral commonalties and differences;
♦ Contribute to improvement in the practice of CBNRM;
♦ Make a range of actors and agencies in Southern Africa more aware of CBNRM 
concepts, activities, methods, opportunities and constraints by stimulating debate 
and by communicating ideas and information;
♦ Contribute to the regional validation of group based systems o f resource tenure 
and management as viable modern frameworks for sustainable development and 
as economically, environmentally and socially legitimate alternatives to 
individualised, freehold based systems.
The programme has two components:
■ comparative analysis of CBNRM issues in Southern Africa that are undertaken 
by programme staff and by recipients of programme research grants; and,
■ communications activities by the programme to disseminate information and 
analysis and stimulate debate on CBNRM through an open and a moderated 
Internet forum; and through the publication of short guideline papers on policy 
and practice, research papers, and newsletters.
Each year, key CBNRM themes are identified by participants within the programme 
to stimulate debate: at regional meetings, through e-mail discussions, and CBNRM 
newsletters. This Occasional Paper Series is designed to publicise research papers 
that have relevant aspects of CBNRM across southern Africa and that may help 
enhance the standard of living of those who practise it.
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List Of Acronyms
cc - Catchment Council
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see - Sub-catchment Council
WMA - Water Management Area
WRMS - Water Resources Management Strategy
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Abstract
This paper presents a comparative review of Zimbabwe and South Africa's water Acts of 
1998. The legislative changes made in both countries were not isolated events. They were 
part of broader reform programs aimed at changing operations of the water sectors in the 
two countries. This paper, therefore, gives a brief background to the water sector reforms in 
both countries in order to place the legislative changes in their proper context. .The main 
objectives and the rationale behind these reforms are outlined. It is argued in the paper that 
there is a considerable amount of similarity between the two countries' main reasons and 
objectives for reforming their water sectors.
The major objectives identified as applicable to both countries include:
♦ Promotion of equality in access to water for aij citizens
♦ To decentralise water management to the catchment level
♦ To increase stakeholder participation in the decision-making process for the water sector
♦ To promote integrated management of water resources
♦ To'make the sector self financing by instituting cost recovery measures and approaches 
in the distribution of water
While a number of objectives of the reforms are pointed out, the attainment of equitable 
access to water is singled out as the most outstanding one.
The paper explores the driving philosophy and generic concepts behind the reforms. 
Relevant literature and documentation is cited in order to clarify some of the fundamental 
concepts dealt with in the paper. In another section, the same fundamental concepts are 
discussed in relation to their applicability to the Zimbabwean and South African situations as 
reflected in the two countries' Water Acts of 1998. An analysis of the main features of the 
two pieces of legislation is made as well as an attempt to bring out their implications for 
water resources management. Important issues left out of the reforms are also pointed out 
and suggestions for improving the legislation are proffered wherever necessary.
IV
1. Introduction
Water is a critical natural resource for development. Zimbabwe and South Africa have been 
involved in a complex and difficult process of reforming their water sectors. Debate on the 
need to revamp the two countries' water sectors ensued in the early 1990s. Under this 
reform process, the need to change the legislation governing, the water sector was identified 
as of paramount importance if the reform were to result in any meaningful change. A review 
of the legislation was initiated culminating in the production of new water Acts for both 
countries in 1998. The main objectives for reforming the water sector are generally similar in 
both countries and a comparative examination of the new Water Acts could provide 
important lessons for both countries. According to Darby, (1997:1) "in many respects, 
Zimbabwe is ahead of South Africa in the water sector reform process. But in many 
important respects, Zimbabwe can benefit greatly by emulating the attitude and actions of 
the South African Government." The new legislation has been formulated with a view to 
bringing the governance of the water sector to the local levels in the general framework that 
Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) principles provide.
Issues of equity in access to water, efficient and sustainable water use, and decentralisation 
of water management to local communities are at the centre of the water reform programs 
being carried out in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Pre-independence legislation in both 
countries largely sidelined these fundamental concerns and the new water legislation is 
expected to address these concerns. New institutions have emerged from the new legal 
framework. The potential effectiveness of the governance regime emanating there from has 
not yet been adequately assessed. But as Darby (1997:13) puts it "the law should not be 
exempt from the consequences of its actions." So far there is no guarantee that the new 
legal frameworks and institutions will be more effective than the old ones, hence the need to 
examine their functionality under the new water management regime.
2. Objectives of the Reforms
A number of objectives of the reforms have been outlined in various documents. For 
Zimbabwe, the objectives are outlined in the Ministry of Lands and Water Resources 
program document for the Development of a National Water Resources Management 
Strategy (WRMS, 1995). For South Africa, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF, 1996) outlined the main principles to be followed and the objectives to be achieved. 
A summary of the identified objectives for both countries is outlined below. Each of the 
objectives applies to both countries.
(i) The promotion of equal access to water for all citizens. This objective took 
cognisance of the fact that most of the available water was mainly being used by a 
small segment of the population (large-scale commercial farmers). Small-scale users 
and communal areas often did not have access to the resource even in cases where 
the resources had been developed in their vicinity. Promoting equal access therefore, 
meant redressing past injustices in water access for the benefit of historically 
disadvantaged smallholder farmers and upcoming indigenous farmers without 
prejudicing large scale commercial and estate concerns (Bolding et. al, 1997:32)
(ii) To promote stakeholder participation and involvement in the decision-making 
process for the water sector. Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development 
(1999:10) states that this is to be done in light of the fact that participation in water 
matters has been restricted to a privileged section of society, the large-scale 
commercial farmers. The legal and institutional provisions did not create an 
environment conducive to stakeholder participation. The need to revamp the legal
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and institutional environment of the water sector was therefore identified^as a high 
priority issue.
(iii) To promote an integrated approach to water resources development planning and 
management. This meant emphasising co-ordinated development and utilisation of 
the resource between and among different sectors in order to maximise the social, 
economic and environmental value of the resources to society.
(iv) To decentralise water management institutions to the river basin level. This entailed 
the formation of water user organisations as smaller units of management that are 
closer to the people on the ground
(v) To remove inefficiencies in water use and make the sector self-sustaining. This 
encompassed putting more emphasis on cost recovery of investments in the water 
sector and treating water as an economic good. Thus, the user-pays principle was 
adopted to reinforce this new focus.
Redressing past injustices in water allocation cannot be successfully earned out without 
systematic legislative and policy changes. With reference to the Zimbabwean situation, 
Kambudzi (1997:59) argues that:
".../rom 1920 to 1980, and at least up to 1990, there existed a legal and 
administrative regime which governed the ownership, access, control and 
use of agro-water in favour o f sectional interests: white commercial 
farming, industry, and mining. This monopoly over access to water rights, 
especially by the white farming community is only being dismantled 
today."
Dismantling that monopoly meant the formulation of a new Water Act and governance 
regime. An almost similar situation prevailed in South Africa due to the apartheid policies. 
Asmal (1997:2) states that more than half of South Africa's water is used by commercial 
farmers, and that water is mostly used (and often inefficiently) by a dominant group which 
had privileged access to land, water and economic power." Without legislative change, it 
would be difficult to dismantle the monopoly of the large-scale commercial farmers over 
water.
The following excerpts taken from South Africa’s Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
publication (1996:31), shows the importance of legal and institutional change in the 
governance of the water sector:
“In South Africa, the department o f water resource managers were fully 
aware that the existing institutional structures and legal framework were 
inadequate to deal with the complexity o f water resources management. ”
“The absence of suitable institutional structures and the presence of an inappropriate legal 
framework also prevented adequate involvement of the public in decisions around the wider 
socio-economic implications of development and resource management.”
Given the above scenario it is only appropriate and necessary to review the new legislation 
in order to find out the extent to which it addresses the shortcomings of the previous water 
management regime in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. From such an analysis, 
conclusions and recommendations may be drawn for the improvement of the management 
of water.
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3. Fundamental concepts behind the reforms
3.1 Equity
Most definitions of equity reflect that it is a value-loaded concept. It is about the need for 
justice, and fairness as defined by a particular society. Okigbo (1987:175) states that "equity 
connotes a sense of fairness, equality and . even-handedness before the law and 
consequently, equitable distribution must begin with the root - the re-arrangement of property 
relations, with ownership and command over resources”. In a speech presented at a 
workshop on water, the South African Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry (September 
1997) stated, "I believe that equity means fairness. Equity means justice. Everyone can 
understand and appreciate fairness and justice. No one would wish to deny another person 
fairness or justice in access to water." While the idea of equity is quite appealing, it should be 
noted that equitable access to water is not the same as equal distribution. In any case, equal 
distribution is not desirable, for the simple reason that it is inconceivable for the water needs of 
one sector to be quantitatively equal to those of another sector. The water needs of a 
communal farmer, for instance, are rarely equal to those of the large-scale commercial farmer. 
What is needed is the evening out of the platform for access to the resource and, to the extent 
possible, the evening out of the platform for utilising the resource to achieve some economic 
benefits. Therefore, equity is a social and political question insofar as it seeks to redress 
historical imbalances in resource allocation.
The issue of equity is also an economic question insofar as it attempts to provide 
disadvantaged groups with the opportunity to actively utilise water and improve their living 
conditions. It appeals to policy-makers to consider the social and political implications of the 
resource distribution system and change it if necessary. It also behoves them to think about 
the economic consequences of that resource distribution system. Basu (1994:24) states that 
"to serve the cause of social equity is to actively work for social change. The attack is on the 
status quo and against powerful interests entrenched in permanent institutions." Legislative 
changes made in Zimbabwe and South Africa were expected to bring about this type of 
change.
The concept of equitable access can appeal to policy-makers and planners to plan for fair 
and just resource allocation and conflict resolution mechanisms. Equity in access to water 
treats water as a resource with an emotional and symbolic value. In agriculture, water (and 
land) availability represents security and large-scale commercial farmers would do all they 
can to cling to as much of these resources as possible even in the face of glaring and acute 
shortages among other groups in society. Any successful reform program therefore, has to 
address the issue of equitable access to the available resources.
3.2 Decentralisation and Stakeholder Participation
A deliberate attempt was made to place the Zimbabwean and South African water sector 
reforms in the context of decentralisation approaches; participatory philosophies and 
stakeholder involvement principles. Decentralisation may be referred to as the formation of 
management structures at levels lower than, and away from, central government. It involves 
the transfer of management functions from the centre to other structures that are closer to 
the communities. This is expected to afford/local'communities and other stakeholders the 
opportunity to meaningfully participate in the design of development initiatives that affect 
them in one way or another (Hill, 1974). While decentralisation and ’participatory 
development' is not the main subject of discussion in this paper, it needs to be mentioned 
that a lot of literature on it abounds and a lot of effort has been devoted to the study of this 
concept (see Mawhood, 1983; Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983; Stohr and Taylor, 1981; World 
Bank, 1993).
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Over the years, development theorists have identified three main models of decentralisation. 
The first one is 'devolution', which involves the transfer of governance responsibility from the 
centre to elected committees or institutions at the local levels (Hyden, 1983; Murphree, 
1991; Murombedzi, 1991). This model has gained considerable popularity and support 
among development theorists mainly because it gives the image of communities deciding 
what to do in terms of developing themselves, as well as how to do it without external 
interference. According to Riddell (1985:211) "devolution, the most politically complete form 
of power allocation, arises through the political necessity to create independent levels of 
'look-alike' sub-national government." In short, devolution has been taken to represent the 
blueprint that gives grassroots people the power to take their destiny into their own hands.
The second model of decentralisation is known as 'de-concentration'. It refers to a situation 
where governance responsibility is transferred from central government to lower structures 
made up of government appointees who will operate at the local levels. (Hyden, 1983; 
Mawhood, 1983). They are more of central government representatives than local 
community representatives. They do not necessarily have the legitimacy to represent locals 
that is found under devolution. They are normally outsiders who will have to learn the ways 
of the communities they operate in before they know what should be done. Even when they 
know, these officials remain alienated from the communities they work in because their 
operations are guided by directives from central government and not the community itself.
The third one is known as the 'mixed-authority'. It brings together people elected at the local 
level, and central government appointees to form one institution of governance at the local 
level. It is a system that gives government the benefits of local participation in decision­
making without having to accept the penalties that may come with i t  Locally elected officials 
represent the people while government appointees provide the technical expertise. This form 
of decentralisation has the disadvantage that the government appointees are not necessarily 
accountable to the local people and may end up dominating the decision-making process. 
Mawhood (1983:7) argues that the mixed authority was a failure in Tanzania because the 
government officials dominated locally elected officials. There were complaints that this was 
just another form of centralised rule and that local control over affairs remained as far off as 
ever.
Despite the differences that one can identify in these models of decentralisation, their 
formulation was based on a number of basic imperatives. Firstly, power and authority should 
be deliberately moved from the centre to the lower levels. Secondly, locals are expected to 
participate more meaningfully and effectively when governmental structures are located in 
their areas. In this respect, decentralisation is seen as a move towards making development 
programs more relevant and responsive to local needs and conditions. Thirdly, pressure of 
work at the centre is supposed to be reduced when some responsibilities are transferred to 
the lower levels.
One outstanding authority on the concept of decentralisation, Mawhood (1983:1), states that 
decentralisation suggests the hope of cracking open the blockages of an inert central 
bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation, giving more direct access of the people to the 
government and the government to the people, stimulating the whole nation to participate in 
national development plans. Equally interesting is the view advanced by Rondinelli et al 
(1983: 29) when they argue that decentralisation implies that actors and agencies 
possessing powers must willingly give them up or be forced or persuaded to do so. In 
addition decentralisation programmes always aim at trying to reduce the alienation of 
particular groups or regions. Stohr and Taylor (1981) refer to decentralisation as 
development from below, implying that there should be a deliberate process of, and 
commitment to, facilitating the initiation of development ideas, projects and programmes 
frorii the grassroots level as opposed to impositions from central government. It is important 
to note that whether or not these imperatives actually materialise in most decentralisation
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initiatives, is a different question altogether since there is usually a gap between theory and 
reality.
From the above, one can deduce that decentralisation is a means of facilitating local 
participation in development programs. It enables the establishment of new management 
institutions at the local level instead of the capital city, the idea being to utilise smaller units 
of management at the lowest possible level. These smaller units are physically more 
manageable than bigger ones and they facilitate the decentralisation of management 
functions to lower levels, in this case the community itself. According to the World Bank 
(1993:14) "the principle is that nothing should be done at a higher level that can be done 
satisfactorily at a lower level." Decentralisation also changes the role that development 
officials play. The development official’s role becomes that of facilitator as opposed to leader 
of the design, implementation and management of the development efforts.
Decentralisation makes the projects more relevant to social, economic, physical and political 
conditions prevailing within specific localities. The developmental needs of one area often 
differ from those of another and this makes the case for decentralisation stronger and that 
for centralised development planning weaker. Centralised planning cannot do it all; it does 
not ensure the collection of first hand information on what is necessary for the development 
of local communities that are far away from the centre unless the communities fully 
contribute. Rondinelli (1984:3) clarifies this view more clearly when he argues that,
“When central planners design rural development projects in the national 
capital without thoroughly understanding local social, economic, physical 
and organisation conditions, they often generate opposition among local 
groups. Central administrators cannot know the complex variety of factors 
that affect the success o f projects in local communities throughout the 
country.”
Implementation of development programs and projects is easier if adequate consultation of 
the intended beneficiaries is carried out. This becomes even more important when viewed in 
the light of the basic goal of sustainable development. It is the beneficiaries who must 
eventually take control of the project when the development agency pulls out and they must 
therefore, be prepared for that take over. They cannot anticipate and prepare for that 
responsibility if they are not consulted right from the beginning. Consulting them also gives 
them a sense of ownership and responsibility over the project and the benefits accruing 
therefrom. The World Bank (1993:16) states that participation is a process in which 
stakeholders influence policy formulation, alternative designs, investment choices, and 
management decisions affecting their communities and establish the necessary sense of 
ownership. The water reforms in South Africa and Zimbabwe were expected to bring about 
this kind of participatory development in the water sector.
3.3 Water as a Social and Economic Good
The Zimbabwean and South African water reforms emphasised the need to view water as 
both a social and economic good. Treating water as a social good, which can be accessed 
at very low prices or free of charge, does not promote efficient use of that water. In both 
countries, increasing water demands have tended to be met by supply oriented solutions. 
The South African minister for Water Affairs and Forestry (1997) argues:
"We must learn to pay the cost of providing and managing our water. Our 
country was built on enormous subsidies and those subsidies remained in 
place long after they were required. Subsidies have been a way of life for 
South Africa. But this cannot continue. It is economic suicide. It is in our 
own self-interest to learn to pay for water. There must be short-term
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subsidies for newcomers, o f course. But in the long-term, subsidies are 
wrong."
The World Bank (1993:30) acknowledges that pricing water well below its economic value is 
prevalent throughout the world. It explains that in many countries, expanding the supply is 
politically expedient, and therefore pricing has received much less attention. Sharma et al 
(1996:xvi) also argues that water, for both domestic consumption and irrigation, is under- 
priced because of inadequate pricing policies and that pricing policies are generally 
influenced by political considerations, preferred users, and equity reasons. The proclamation 
to treat water as an economic good originated in the Dublin conference on water and the 
environment held in 1992. Since then, it has spread slowly across the globe. But like other 
proclamations of such a nature, it has the advantage of being designed in a vague enough 
manner to allow applicability in various countries. The practical operational content remains 
undefined thereby leaving room for individual countries to implement it in a way that suits 
their different environments.
The economic value of water is mainly derived from the fact that it is often scarce and finite 
while social value arises from its status as a basic commodity that sustains life. In 
acknowledging the value of water as an economic good, care must be taken to ensure that 
water pricing and investment decisions are economically and environmentally sustainable. 
Cost recovery becomes much more essential and the provision of water as an exclusively 
social or public sector activity is discouraged. However, due to the social value of water, 
strategies of safeguarding the community’s basic needs for water should be adopted. 
Reconciling the social and economic values of water can be very difficult. One can only 
strive to establish a delicate mix of the two when water resources projects are initiated.
Treating water as an economic good means viewing it like any other private good, subject to 
allocation through the market system. However, the market is rarely the perfect instrument 
for allocating goods that are basic to human survival. The important question is, therefore, 
not whether water should be treated as an economic good but whether we can allow water 
to be allocated according to market principles and forces only. In answering this question, 
one has to bear in mind that water is a basic human need and therefore, its allocation has to 
be carried out taking into consideration some social imperatives. The need for emphasising 
the user pays principle and cost recovery has to be delicately balanced with the users’ ability 
to pay lest other users will be deprived of this basic need.
In most rural areas, of developing countries, water for domestic purposes would be difficult 
to treat as an economic good because many people would not be able or willing to pay for 
the water. The scenario might change in the case of agricultural water because this is a very 
productive sector that generates considerable profits. If water is provided cheaply for 
commercial farmers, the farmers may take as much water as they can even to the point of 
water-logging without considering efficient use. They have no incentive to save water and 
increasing water prices becomes a potential solution for arresting this problem. The paradox 
mainly lies in the need to create an environment conducive for new comers in the 
commercial farming business, particularly small-scale commercial farmers, to establish 
themselves. If they are just treated as the large-scale commercial farmers, they may face 
serious problems in terms of ability to pay.
If one of the goals is to encourage the previously disadvantaged groups to start engaging in 
irrigation activities, asking the same groups to pay for water could be construed as 
contradictory because some genuinely do not have the money to pay for water. Subsidising 
water for the poor groups in society might be an option. Perry et. al. (1997:13) argue that if 
basic human needs for safe domestic water and food production by irrigation are to be met 
in poor countries, some degree of Subsidy may be necessary so that masses c, poor people
6
are not priced out of the market. A delicate balance will therefore, have to be struck 
between the need to treat water as an economic commodity as well as a social good.
3.4 Sustainability
In water resources management the concept of sustainability has to do with the utilisation of 
the resource in a way that does not negate the conservation needs of the physical 
environment in which the water is located. To a considerable extent, this depends on 
effectiveness of the institutions and management systems put in place to look after the 
'esource. In short, sustainability has to do with the question of how to preserve the 
environment for future generations as well as how to ensure that the management systems 
established remain functional for a long time. DWAF (1996:9) argues that sustainable 
resource use is one where, with effective management, the rate of resource withdrawal, use, 
consumption or depletion should always be balanced (preferably exceeded) by the rate of 
replenishment. In the process, the selected and agreed characteristics oflhe resource (e.g. 
quality, biological diversity, resistance to adverse change) should be maintained.
Sustainable development should, however, not be confused with growth or change. It entails 
achieving a compromise between protecting the ecological resource base and allowing for 
economic growth to take place through carefully managed use of the available resource. 
DWAF puts a lot of emphasis on the protection of the physical environment. It underplays 
the importance of the legal and institutional dynamics that are inevitable as communities and 
governments attempt to systematise conservation of the resource. The concept of 
sustainability reminds us that the human needs for water or any other natural resource 
should not deprive other organisms in the ecosystem of the same resource. Due 
consideration must be paid to conservation practices that ensure the continued availability of 
the resource in the face of changing utilisation patterns as human needs for the resource 
grow. In water resources management, the environment is seen as a water user in its own 
right that deserves some share of the resource during allocation. The basic idea behind is to 
leave some water running in rivers for the benefit of the natural plant and animal habitat 
whose suivival is dependent on water.
Natural resources management theorists have identified a number of elements inherent in 
the key concepts embodied in sustainable development and management of water 
resources (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Berkes 1993; Oakerson and Walker, 1997). The first 
element concerns itself with the need to consider the welfare of both present and future 
generations when utilising water. Secondly, there is need to view water as a finite resource 
whose exploitation is also finite, on the ground that this is the only way to protect resource 
for use and exploitation in the long term. Thirdly, there is also the need to consider the role 
of equity principles in the allocation of rights to the water. This implies that the access to, and 
use of the resource, made by one user must take into account the needs of other users. The 
fourth element concerns itself with the need to ensure that environmental considerations are 
integrated into the development plans and that development needs are taken into account in 
setting environmental objectives.
The fourth element mentioned above is more focused on institutional effectiveness and 
sustainability. Here reference to institutional sustainability is relevant insofar as institutions 
are outcomes of the prevailing legislation and policy. Institutional sustainability will not be 
possible where support systems are poor particularly in terms of finance, basic organisation, 
and technical capacity. In addition, participation of stakeholders, on whom decisions made 
by the institution impinge, is essential. Equally important is the need for the stakeholders to 
be convinced that their participation will benefit them in some substantial way. This line of 
thought is not new in natural resources management theory. Murphree (1991:2) argues that 
people seek to manage the environment when the benefits of management are perceived to 
exceed its costs. Murombedzi (1991:17) echoes the same sentiments when he states that
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the success of all rural resource management programs is predicated on the existence of an 
acceptable resource management regime in which all users are involved in decision-making 
and stand to benefit from the management. The need for tangible benefits to be perceived 
as likely to accrue to the users who manage water cannot be emphasised more. It is a 
crucial part of the motivational equation for sustainable natural resources management.
4. A Review of the Water Acts
It is interesting to note that the new water Acts for the two countries were both passed in the 
later half 1998. A study of the two water Acts reveals that they were written with a view to 
addressing the fundamental concerns already mentioned in this paper. The spirit behind 
both Acts seems to be one of establishing equitable access to the resource, decentralising 
management responsibility to local levels, ensuring sustainability and treating water as both 
an economic and social good. There are some essential issues about which the Water Acts 
are silent or gaps that they did not fill. There are also some missing links in terms of the 
operationalization of some of the provisions of the Acts. This paper will try to expose all 
these issues accordingly.
4.1 Equity
The two Water Acts are quite explicit on the need to ensure equity in access to water as well 
as emphasising the importance of the other fundamental concerns mentioned above. Closer 
analysis though, shows that the South African Water Act demonstrates more commitment to 
the ideal of equity than the Zimbabwean water Act. A comparison of the two Acts' preambles 
will demonstrate this. The South African Water Act of 1998 preamble states:
To provide for fundamental reform of the law relating to water resources ... Recognising that 
while water is a natural resource that belongs to all people, the discriminatory laws and 
practices of the past have prevented equal access to water, and use of water resources; 
Acknowledging the national government's Overall responsibility for and authority over the 
nation's water resources and their use, including equitable allocation of water for the 
beneficial use, the redistribution of water and international water matters ..."
Chapter 1 section 2(b) points out that one of the purposes of the Act is "promoting equitable 
access to water" and Section 2(c) "redressing the results of past racial and gender 
discrimination." Section 79 (4) (a) provides more emphasis on equity when it states that in 
perfofThing its functions, a catchment management agency must "be mindful of the 
constitutional imperative to address the results of past racial and gender discrimination and 
to achieve equitable access for all to the water resources under its control." Clearly stating 
the need for equity right from the beginning grounds the whole Act in one of the basic 
principles that are now universally recognised as essential.
The Zimbabwean Water Act preamble on the other hand does not contain any statement 
that recognises the importance of equity. On the contrary, its preamble emphasises control 
of water resources and protection of the quality of water. It is only later in the Act (section 6 
(1) (c) that equity is mentioned and even then, just as one of the issues that the minister 
must be concerned with and not as a basic guiding principle of the Act. Section 6 (1) (c) 
states that one of the functions of the minister shall be "to ensure the equitable and efficient 
allocation of the available water resources in the national interest..." It is argued here that 
the Zimbabwean Water Act of 1998 does not adequately emphasise the issue of equitable 
access to water while the South African Water Act gives the issue sufficient attention.
It is however, quite relieving to note that both Acts do away with the practice of issuing 
licenses/permits for the use of water in perpetuity. They are now issued for a limited number 
of years after which they are subject to review. Section 28 (e) of the South African Water Act
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states that the license period may not exceed forty years. Section 28 (f) states that the 
review periods for the license must be at intervals of not more than five years. The 
Zimbabwean water Act on the other hand has almost similar provisions. Section 36 (1) 
states that a permit shall be valid for a period of twenty years or such shorter or longer 
period as a catchment council may fix. Section 36(3) specifies conditions under which a 
permit may be amended.
Both acts provide for the change in quantity of water allocated to a particular permit or 
license, extension of period of use, or cancellation of permit depending on how beneficial the 
water is being put to use. This is a big step in the struggle for levelling the playing field for all 
water users. What it implies is that in both countries, an opportunity has been created to 
review the allocations to different users and a possible adjustment of the allocations based 
on an assessment of the reasonableness of the use to which the water is put. In some 
cases, this might free up a significant volume of water for other users to take up. The fact 
that permits/licenses are to be issued for a limited time-span also implies that they can be 
withdrawn for reallocation to other more deserving users. New comers to the water sector 
can be easily accommodated. In Zimbabwe for instance, the previous water regime had 
made it difficult to accommodate new water users because of the priority date system, which 
allocated water on the basis of first in last out. This meant that those with earlier water rights 
would enjoy their full allocations first before later applicants could. There was no equitable 
access to the resource. A reversal of this situation must be seen as a welcome improvement 
to accessing water.
4.2 Decentralisation and Stakeholder Participation
The case for decentralisation of water management to the local levels is not contestable in 
both countries and the new legislation is also unequivocal on this. Both Acts address this 
concept in an almost similar manner. They specify the need to move water management to 
the river basin or catchment level to facilitate more stakeholder participation in the 
management of the resource. This results in the formation of user based institutions known 
in Zimbabwe as Catchment Councils (CCs) and in South Africa as Catchment Management 
Agencies (CMAs). In Zimbabwe CCs manage all the water in a particular catchment and in 
South Africa, the CMA manages all water in a Water Management Area (WMA). Chapter 7 
of the South African Water Act states that the purpose of establishing CMAs is to delegate 
water resources management to the regional or catchment level and to involve local 
communities, within the framework of the national water resource strategy. Section 11 (1) of 
the Zimbabwean Water Act states that the minister may declare any catchment area to be a 
river system. Section 11(2) also states that a river system shall be under the control of a 
catchment council.
Subsequent to the formulation of the new legislation, South Africa was divided into 19 water 
management areas and Zimbabwe into 7 catchments managed by CMAs and CCs 
respectively. Therefore, the legislation has already started to be translated into practice in 
both countries. Both the CMAs and the CCs are body corporates capable of suing and being 
sued at law. Section 79 (1) (a) of the South African Water Act states that a catchment 
management agency is a body corporate, and has the powers of a natural person of full 
capacity. Section 20 (2) of the Zimbabwean Water Act states that a catchfnent council shall 
be a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued in its own name and of performing 
such functions as a body corporate may by law perform.
CMAs and CCs are expected to have overall responsibility for the management of water in 
their areas of jurisdiction. To carry out this duty, they will be assisted by technical and 
administrative staff. In Zimbabwe, the Water Act provides for the establishment of a new 
parastatal, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA). The parastatal is expected to 
take over the management and development of water resources countrywide on a
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commercial basis as well as to provide technical support to the CCs. In effect, the CCs are 
accountable to ZINWA. In South Africa, overall national responsibility for water management 
remains the domain of DWAF. In Zimbabwe, the Department for Water Development (DWD) 
will retain a policy-making role, it will be heavily streamlined and most of its workforce will be 
transferred to ZINWA. The implications of the above are that the Zimbabwe Water Act has 
created more structures at the top than the South African one. Total power and authority 
vested in ZINWA and DWD is equivalent to that held by DWAF in South Africa. The potential 
for bureaucratic difficulties is higher in Zimbabwe than in South Africa.
Analysis of the emerging water management regimes in the two countries would be 
incomplete if no mention is made of the position of chief executive officer (CEO) or 
catchment manager that exists at the catchment level. This position carries the responsibility 
of running the day-to-day activities of the CMA or the CC. Major differences exist between 
the two Water Acts regarding this position. Schedule 4, section 3 of the South African Water 
Act stipulates that the CMA governing board'may appoint a suitably qualified person as chief 
executive officer of the institution. Section 28 (1) of the Zimbabwean Water Act states that 
for the day-to-day management and administration of the affairs of a catchment council, 
there shall be a catchment manager who shall be an employee of the National Water 
Authority. The main difference being emphasised here is that in South Africa, the CEO is 
appointed by the CMA board and is therefore, accountable to an authority at the catchment 
level. In Zimbabwe, the catchment manager is appointed by ZINWA and is therefore 
accountable to an authority based in the capital city. The possibility of friction between this 
catchment manager and the CC cannot be ruled out. It would be better for the manager to 
be accountable to the CC (as is the case in South Africa) because this is the authority 
responsible for management of water in the catchment. In the given circumstances, it might 
be difficult for the CC to hold the manager accountable to them, yet they are supposed to be 
the custodians of all water in their catchments. In terms of development theory, the set-up 
provided for in the Zimbabwean water Act conforms to the mixed authority mode of 
decentralisation in which governmental appointees are brought together with local 
representatives to form a management institution at the local level. Unfortunately, chances 
are that the governmental appointees will dominate the decision-making and deliberations at 
that level.
Other Water Act provisions regarding the position of catchment manager in Zimbabwe are 
also a mockery to stakeholder participation. Section 29 of the Zimbabwean Water Act 
permits the catchment manager to grant water permits, extend the duration of a permit, or 
cancel existing permits as long as the CC is not meeting. The same provision goes further to 
state that any parties to a dispute may make submissions to the catchment manager and his 
decision over that matter will have the same force as if it were a, decision of a catchment 
council. The amount of power granted to the catchment mianager in Zimbabwe is 
questionable and has already been a subject for heated debate in various fora. Some of the 
questions that arise include whether the amount of power granted to the manager will not 
create conflict between him and the CC; if the catchment manager can single-handedly 
issue out permits, then what guarantee do we have that he will not abuse this power by 
granting permits to friends or those who bribe him? In addition to this, if he can cancel a 
permit or preside over a dispute and still make a decision with the same "force" as that of 
CC, are the implications of this on stakeholder participation and democratic governance 
encouraging ones? A general answer to these questions is that stakeholder consultation and 
participation may easily be negated in the Zimbabwean model than the South African one. 
This will depend, to a large extent, on the personality involved. In other words, some may be 
corrupted by the power delegated to them and some may not. Nevertheless, the legislation 
appears to provide room for abuse.
The South African Water Act spells out the need to promote stakeholder participation. 
Section 80 (e) states that one of the functions of the CMAs is "to promote community
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participation in the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of 
the water resources in its management area." The Zimbabwean Water Act might be slightly 
less obvious in spelling out the issue of stakeholder participation but closer scrutiny reveals 
that it is covered to some extent. Section 6 (2) (c) states that it is the duty of the minister to 
encourage participation of all consumers in all sectors and catchment councils in the 
development, exploitation and distribution of water resources. Section 25 (1) of the Act 
states that before proceeding to the determination of any matter submitted to it, a catchment 
council shall satisfy itself that all persons who, in its opinion, have an interest which is 
reasonably likely to be adversely affected by the determination have been duly notified of the 
proceedings. The emphasis put on the formation of catchment-based management 
structures and stakeholder participation in both countries takes care of the need for 
decentralising management of the resource to the community. The idea is to take advantage 
of the utility of smaller units of management at the catchment level rather than managing the 
resource at the central government level because the central government level is usually 
quite removed from the realities at the grassroots level.
In line with the above development route, the new legislation in both countries goes further 
to decentralise management responsibility to structures below the catchment level. In 
Zimbabwe, there are Sub-Catchment Councils (SCCs) while in South Africa, the equivalence 
of the SCC is the Geographical Catchment Management Committee (GCMC) as well as 
other advisory committees that the CMA may form. These lower structures are expected to 
feed relevant information into the upper structures as well as carrying out other duties 
delegated to them by the higher structures. This further decentralises power closer to the 
communities that the new structures are expected to serve.
Due to geographical and logistical problems, it is necessary to further decentralise 
management responsibility to units that are smaller than the SCC or the GCMC. the  South 
African, Water Act provides for the establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs). 
These will manage water in very small localities like the catchment area of a small stream 
while at the same time pursuing other water related interests as laid down in their 
constitution. Chapter 8 of the South African Water Act states that although water user 
associations are water management institutions, their primary purpose, unlike the catchment 
management agencies, is not water management. They operate at a restricted localised 
level, and are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to 
undertake water-related activities for their mutual benefit. The CMAs or the responsible 
minister may delegate other duties to the WUAs.
In Zimbabwe, the new Water Act does not provide for the establishment of WUAs. To the 
extent that the Zimbabwean Water Act is silent on the issue of this lower tier, one can argue 
that the South African water Act provides for a better water management regime, which is 
more responsive to the needs of people at the grassroots level. The fact that it takes 
cognisance of the need to decentralise management responsibility to the lowest possible 
level makes it a better management instrument than the Zimbabwean one. However, the 
pilot catchment planning projects of the Mazowe and Mupfure catchments have already 
established WUAs or Water User Boards in order to ensure effective management of the 
resource. The functionality of these structures is threatened by their lack of legitimacy since 
they are not recognised in the new Water Act. They do not have logistical and financial 
support from government and donors. This seriously affects their operations. Members of the 
pilot catchment planning projects have already been lobbying central government to legalise 
this lowest tier in the management hierarchy in order to arrest the problem. The need for this 
lower institutional structure appears axiomatic. South Africa has already provided for it in the 
Water Act and Zimbabwe is well advised to follow suit.
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4.3 Sustainability
Both Acts emphasise the need for proper catchment planning and management in the 
physical sense for the conservation of the available water resources through integrated 
catchment management (ICM). This means putting more emphasis on the interface 
between human activities, land and water resources. A little bit of the theory, behind the 
concept could be helpful.
The Australian Water Association defines ICM as:
“A holistic natural resources management system comprising interrelated 
elements of land and water in a river basin, managed on an ecological 
and economic basis. It is a system that favors the integration of 
environmental policy across government, community, and industrial 
sectors through partnerships and extensive stakeholder inclusion.” (Water 
Tec Consultants report -  1999:9)
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992 described ICM as a concept
“.. .based on the perception of water as an integral part o f the ecosystem, a 
natural resource and social and economic good,....water resources have to 
be protected, taking into account the functioning of aquatic ecosystems,
...in order to satisfy and reconcile needs for water in human activities. ”
It suffices to state that the above definitions neatly sum up the ideal situation and that this 
ideal situation is reflected in the new legislation. Both Acts, spell out the need to manage 
water systematically by relying on properly formulated catchment management plans and 
strategies. Chapter 2, Part 2 of the South African Water Act requires every catchment 
management agency to progressively develop a catchment management strategy for the 
water resources within its water management area. Catchment management strategies 
must be in harmony with the national water resources strategy. The same part also clearly 
states that the catchment management strategy must set principles for allocating water to 
existing and prospective users, taking into account all matters relevant to the protection, 
use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources.
For Zimbabwe, section 12 (1) states that for the purpose of ensuring optimum development 
and utilisation of the water resources, the National Water Authority, and the catchment 
council concerned, shall prepare an outline water development plan for every river system. 
The requirements in both Acts show that water will not be allocated in a haphazard manner 
and this has positive implications for conservation and sustainability of the resource. It 
gives room for the catchment to be managed in an integrated manner. Section 6(2) (h) 
points out that the minister must promote efficiency and economy in the utilisation of water 
resources and encourage the use of water serving technologies. This provision reminds 
one that a lot could be gained in using less water in a more efficient manner. Given the 
growing demands for water every day, water saving is an option in the battle for sustainable 
utilisation of the resource.
Both Acts have strict provisions on environmental conservation and pollution control. They 
also treat the environment as a water user in its own right. Section 6 (1) (b) of the 
Zimbabwean Water Act states that one of the minister's functions will be to ensure the 
availability of water to all citizens for primary purposes and to meet the needs of aquatic 
and associated systems particularly when there are competing demands. It is also specified 
in section 67 (a) that due consideration shall be given to "the protection, conservation and 
sustenance of the environment". Section 68 of the same Act provides for pollution permits
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which will ensure that those who pollute water sources will have to pay much more than 
before for polluting the country's water. Those caught polluting without permits will be 
punished severely. This is the application of what has come to be commonly known as the 
'polluter pays principle.'
In the South African Water Act, one finds almost similar provisions. Chapter 3, part 4 of the 
Act deals with pollution prevention, and in particular the situation where pollution of a water 
resource occurs or might occur as a result of activities on land. The person who owns, 
controls, occupies or uses the land in question is responsible for taking measures to 
prevent pollution of water resources. If these measures are not taken, the catchment 
management agency concerned may itself do whatever is necessary to prevent or to 
remedy its effects, and to recover all reasonable costs from the persons responsible for the 
pollution. What the South African Water Act does not provide for are permits for polluting. 
This might make it difficult for monitoring to be carried out since there will be no data-base 
to which one can refer to on a regular basis. In the Zimbabwean case, monitoring might be 
slightly easier since polluters are expected to apply for permits and be registered.
One interesting issue addressed by both the South African and the Zimbabwean Water Act 
is that of water management in times of shortages or acute droughts. Both Acts give priority 
to primary and environmental water needs. They provide for the strict regulation of water 
use in order to ensure that there is some water for the environment. Chapter 3, Part 3 of 
the South African Water Act states that water shall be reserved for the ecology in order to 
protect the aquatic ecosystems of the water resource. In addition, the reserve refers to both 
quantity and quality of the water in the resource, and will vary depending on the class of the 
resource. Similarly, section 57 of the Zimbabwean Water Act provides for a certain amount 
of water to be reserved for future use. In section 61, it goes further to provide for the 
declaration of water shortage areas when the minister and the CC concerned are of the 
opinion that water in a public stream has ceased flowing or is likely to cease flowing. In a 
water shortage area, water permits are suspended and water is reallocated taking into 
consideration the lower quantities available. This ensures that the water is not abstracted 
beyond sustainable limits.
Institutional effectiveness is a part of the sustainability concept. The new legislation 
attempts to ensure this by providing for the decentralisation process already described in 
this paper. The strength of decentralisation would lie in the fact that institutions that emerge 
at the catchment level are likely to be more relevant to the social, economic and political 
conditions prevailing at the local level. In terms of day-to-day operations, locally based 
institutions tend to incur fewer costs than national ones because they do not have huge 
transport costs. Locally elected institutions are more effective than national ones because 
they easily gain legitimacy among the communities they serve. Unlike local officials, 
external agents are more susceptible to being viewed as strangers or intruders who come 
to disturb local systems of resource utilisation. To continue dwelling on the advantages of 
catchment based institutions is not necessary here because it would mean to recite 
decentralisation theory. It suffices to state that to the extent that both Acts provide for a shift 
of water management responsibilities from the confines of central government to the 
catchment level, they address the need to facilitate the growth of effective institutions and 
by extension, sustainable resource utilisation and management.
One issue that impacts on institutional capacity and sustainability is that of support from 
central government. There are many cases in which decentralised institutions for resource 
management are not given the requisite financial support or autonomy. The manner in 
which new institutions are financed has a bearing on how effective they are in carrying out 
their duties. Section 84 (1) of the South African Water Act points out that a catchment 
management agency may raise funds required by it for the purpose of exercising any of its 
powers and carrying out any of its duties. Section 84 (2) also states that the CMA must be
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funded by (a) money appropriated by parliament; (b) water use charges. The Zimbabwean 
Water Act only specifies that SCCs can levy water users in their areas to raise funds for 
their operations. It is silent on funding for CCs and one is left speculating as to whether the 
funding of CCs will be provided by central government, ZINWA or from collection of levies 
in their areas of jurisdiction. This leaves unclear the question of whether the CCs will have 
sufficient funds to operate effectively and sustainably.
It is also necessary to point out that the new Zimbabwean Water Act has the shortcoming of 
not recognising the water user association level. The result is that the WUAs will not be 
eligible for technical, financial, and advocacy assistance from central government. Like their 
South African counterpart, the WUAs in Zimbabwe are responsible for the management of 
water in a relatively small area in comparison to the CCs and CMAs but geographically, the 
total area is still a huge entity that cannot effectively function without the necessary support 
from the government. Musami WUA in the Mazowe catchment for instance has an area of 
84 980 hectares. The likely result of this situation is that the institution responsible for 
conveying information to the grassroots level (the WUA) is incapacitated. If the WUA is not 
fully functional, information and education about the reforms will not reach the intended 
target. Sustainable management of the resource is therefore, threatened because of 
institutional incapacity.
4.4 W ater as a Social and Economic Good
In line with the need to recover costs of water provision, the South African Water Act 
provides for the setting of water use charges taking into consideration the fact that there are 
social obligations that must also be realised. Chapter 5, part 1 of the Act states that the 
minister may, from time to time, after public consultation, establish a pricing strategy which 
may differentiate among geographical areas, categories of water users or individual water 
users. Water use charges are to be used to fund the direct and related costs of water 
resources management, development and use, and may also be used to achieve an 
equitable and efficient allocation of water. In a sense, the “user pays” and the “polluter pays” 
principles already described elsewhere in this paper are being applied in both countries. The 
Zimbabwean Water Act does not provide for the fixing of water prices but this is covered 
under the Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act. Section 30 of the ZINWA Act states that 
the Authority may fix charges for the sale of raw and treated water; disposal of wastewater; 
drilling of boreholes and provision of consultancy services. It further provides for the fixing of 
different charges for the sale of water to different classes of people or for different uses 
(price discrimination). What the new legislation in both countries does is to emphasise the 
importance of viewing water as an economic good without necessarily negating its 
importance as a social good. The differentiation of pricing among different users shows that 
the legislation takes cognisance of the fact that some may be able to afford to pay for the 
water at a particular price while some may not. Small though the charges envisaged may 
appear, they have the potential to put many small farmers out of business.
The importance of the social nature of water is further emphasised in both the Zimbabwean 
and the South African Water Acts by providing for the needs of water for primary purposes. 
Both Acts state that there shall be no charges for primary water use. The Zimbabwean 
Water Act however goes a step further to provide some protection for communal areas. The 
South African Water Act has the shortcoming of not catering for the needs of communal 
areas in a clear and straightforward manner. Almost no water is allocated to the communal 
areas and little provision is made for future allocations to these areas. One wants to believe 
that the communal areas are provided for under the section that deals with the reserve 
because if that is not the case, an area with potential for considerable water use is being 
neglected. Section 48 (1) of the Zimbabwean Water Act stipulates that in exercising his 
powers, the minister shall have due regard to the interests of occupants of communal land. 
Section 51 (1) states that no permits granted by a catchment council, other than water
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granted to a local authority for primary purposes, shall have the effect of depriving persons 
of the use of water for primary purposes. Section 2 (a) of the South African Water Act states 
that the purpose of the Act is to meet the basic human needs of present and future 
generations. Schedule 1 of the same Act stipulates that a person may take water for 
reasonable domestic use; small gardening not for commercial purposes; watering animals; 
and recreational purposes. In both Acts, water for primary purposes does not require a 
license or permit. The implications of this are clear. Water is a basic need in terms of human 
survival and no matter how much we may want to treat it as an economic good, primary 
water use needs to be excluded from this requirement.
5. Concluding remarks
It is interesting to note that both countries are currently undertaking water and land reforms 
but the two reforms have been kept separate. Even the legislation has also not addressed 
the need to bring the two reforms together. In South Africa, indications are that there is little 
or no water left for the establishment of new farmers on new land. The available water has 
largely been allocated to users. In Zimbabwe, there is still some water that can be harnessed 
and developed for new users but it does not necessarily lie on irrigable land. Large-scale 
commercial farmers have already taken up most fertile land. Provision of water to communal 
lands for instance will not necessarily translate into widespread utilisation of the water 
because irrigable land is scarce. We therefore, have a situation whereby South Africa might 
have the land but no water and Zimbabwe might have the water but no land. The need for 
land reform cannot be separated from water reform. In addition, equity of access to water or 
land is not enough; it must be complemented by access to other support services, at least in 
the short term, in order to make the new regime viable and sustainable. Land policy, water 
policy, and irrigation policy cannot be dealt with in isolation. There are also indications in 
both countries that central government will play a reduced role in the development of new 
infrastructure for water development.
The legislation does not sufficiently emphasise the need to educate and train the CCs and 
CMAs in order to build their capacity. The assumption seems to be that once formed, these 
institutions will start functioning effectively. Without sufficient capacity building, the new 
institutions may not work. The legislation does not adequately consider provision of 
incentives and disincentives for promotion of water efficient technology as an option that 
helps in the battle for sustainability. This could have been given more attention. The 
contribution of other governmental departments is vital in carrying the water reforms to 
successful completion but what happens if they do not cooperate? The legislation is silent on 
the operational procedures to be followed in order to ensure their co-operation. Inter- 
ministerial and interdepartmental collaboration needs to be spelt out clearly in the Acts.
Despite the gaps identified above, the review of the two Acts has generally shown that the 
core purpose and spirit behind the new legislation is to ensure the utilisation of water 
resources in line with the equity, efficiency, sustainability and stakeholder participation 
principles. Redressing past imbalances in water use and allocation is definitely on the 
agenda in both countries. However, care must be taken to ensure that what was wrong in 
the past is not corrected by doing something wrong today. Certainly, both countries have 
reached a turning point in their history and the new legislation is clear testimony to this. Most 
of the differences identified between the two Acts are minor. It remains to be seen whether 
the legislation will be successfully put into practice. In the foreseeable future, there will be 
need for research to be carried to assess the practical application of the reforms on the 
ground.
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